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Abstract
While it is recognised that there must be segregation between corporate and process control networks in order
to achieve a higher level of security, there is evidence that this is not occurring. Computer and network
vulnerability assessments were carried out on three Australian critical infrastructure providers to determine
their level of security. The security measures implemented by each organisation have been mapped against best
practice recommendations for achieving segregation between process control and corporate networks. One of
the organisations used a model which provided a dedicated information security team for provision of security
for the process control networks. One of the other organisations relied heavily on outsourcing for their IT
security, and a third used in house corporate IT for their process control security. It was found that the
organisation using a dedicated IT security team that worked within the process control group achieved the
highest level of security when mapped to best practice. This paper concludes that best practice
recommendations for critical infrastructure providers should also include guidelines for the organisational
structure, and further, that dedicated IT security personnel be placed within the process control group.
Keywords: SCADA security, critical infrastructure protection, organisational model, operational technology,
information technology

INTRODUCTION
Process control systems (PCS), of which supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are a
subset, are used by critical infrastructure operators to regulate and manage the operation of critical systems such
as power, water and gas. In addition, these systems control everything from traffic lights through to large scale
refineries and mining operations. All critical infrastructure providers also rely upon these systems for safety and
reliability, through continuous monitoring and operation. These systems were originally designed around
reliability and safety, and if they were network connected they were connected on isolated internal networks for
the purposes of control and management; essentially a closed system. Typically in these situations security was
not a consideration due to the isolated nature of the systems and their closed nature. It should be remembered
that these systems were implemented also in an era when computing and information technology will also
largely conducted in isolated installations or laboratories around the globe (Stouffer et al, 2008).
With advances in technology, we are becoming increasingly interconnected and interdependent on these
connections for the full functioning of modern society. One of the main conduits and enablers for this has been
the rapid expansion of the Internet. Correspondingly, as a result of the growth of the Internet there has been a
convergence on the TCP/IP protocol suite as the dominant network protocol for business and industry
(Steenstrup, 2010). This has seen many hardware and software vendors, including SCADA vendors, align their
products with this kind of reality (Igure et al, 2006).
The increased interconnection of SCADA systems to corporate networks is a significant threat in itself, enabling
and making them accessible to undesirable entities. Be it directed attacks, opportunistic scanning or malfeasant
insiders (Jackson-Higgins, 2007), these once stand-alone systems are now vulnerable to a range of new attack
vectors. While insider malfeasance may only account for some 20% of attacks against a system, the percentage
of the costs related to insider attacks is nearer to 80% (Baker et al, 2009). The most infamous of the intentional
insider attacks against a critical infrastructure provider is the case of Maroochydore shire. Their SCADA system
was attacked by a person who had been employed to install the system after a request for employment was
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turned down (Smith, 2001). The attacker stole a laptop when he left which contained all of the tools and codes
required to remotely operate the control system, and it took some time for the operators to locate the source of
the issues he was causing. Additionally, most security measures are outward facing, and are not intended to
detect against insider malfeasance. Insider attack must be a significant concern for CIPs, and gives further
weight to the need for internal segregation between control system and corporate networks.
The research reported in this paper was based on the examination of a number of case studies conducted under
the Federal Governments computer and network vulnerability assessment (CNVA) program. The CNVA
program is an Australian Government grants scheme developed to help ensure the security of Australia’s critical
infrastructure (TISN 2008).

RECOMMENDED BEST PRACTICE FOR SECURING SCADA
This paper drew on a range of literature in order to create a composite, best practice list of features and
strategies for securing process control systems, and as a guideline for measuring the compliance of an
organisation against the organisational model. The first piece of literature used for this purpose is the NIST
Guide to industrial control system security (Stouffer et al, 2008). This guide was produced by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a United States Government Organisation, and the guide itself is
put forward as recommended best practice by US-CERT. In addition to using the NIST guide as a reference
point for determining effectiveness of the organisational structure, a range of other network security best
practice measures have also been used including ANSI/ISA-TR99.00.01-2007 Security Technologies for
Industrial Automation and Control Systems (ISA, 2007), Idaho National Labs Control Systems Cyber Security –
Defense in Depth Guide (INL, 2006).

Table 1: Common methodology used to assess the three organisations. Multiple other methods used for other CNVAs,
components of assessment all align with NIST best practice.

Category

Specific Measures

Firewall

External
Multiple
Multiple (different vendors)
Firewall rule sets configured correctly
Firewall OS / firmware patched?

Network Segregation

DMZ between corporate and PCS
DMZ between Internet and Corporate
Logical segregation through VLANs and subnets
Access Control lists on border routers
Intrusion Detection

Remote Access

Secure authentication method
Two factor authentication
RSA token authentication

Documentation

Policies current
Policy audited or enforced?
Network topology diagrams current
Network topology diagrams available
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ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE TYPES
The structure of the three organisations in terms of their positioning of information security management, or
provision of IT security services is given in figure 1. The structure represented as organisation 1 had a dedicated
Information Security Manager as well as system administrators responsible for the security and operation of the
process control networks embedded in the SCADA division of the organisation.
(a)

Organisation 1 – SCADA ownership of IT services
SCADA / Process control system

Corporate

Information

Information

Information Technology

Information Technology

(b)

Organisation 2 – Corporate Ownership of IT services
SCADA / Process control system

Corporate

Information
Information Technology

(c)

Organisation 3 – Outsourced ownership of IT services
SCADA / Process control system

Corporate

Information

Information Technology
Figure 1: Three different organisational models of placement of the information security (IS) team placement relative to
SCADA / process control systems. (a) This organisation has a dedicated IS team in the SCADA section of the organisational
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model in addition to the corporate IS team. (b) This organisation has no dedicated in house SCADA based IS team, and
relies upon the corporate IS team to provide IT security for their control system infrastructure. (c) Organisation three out
sources it’s IT systems to a third party, but does still retain a corporate IS manager.

REPORTED ISSUES FROM THE CNVA CASE STUDIES
After establishing a baseline for what security measures a CIP should have in place, results of vulnerability
assessments carried out on Australian CIPs was then examined. The organisations represented here were
participants in a computer and network vulnerability assessment, a national program supported by the Australian
Federal Government. The three organisations used for this paper were chosen as they were assessed using a
common methodology, and given that other variables are not controlled, it is hoped that their relative overall
security level should be comparable, The generic security issues found in the Australian CNVAs conducted
using a common methodology can be summarised as follows.

Governance
All cases had significant issues with effective governance of the critical infrastructure assets. In this case we
mean the assets to be both the corporate and SCADA networks of the organisations the authors examined. All
organisations demonstrated poor delineation of corporate ownership and responsibility for the SCADA networks
and in some cases the supporting information technology infrastructures.

Policy
As a result of poor governance structures within the organisations the policy structures also suffered. There was
little evidence of any policy review, enforcement, auditing or existence of any policy implementation. Review
of the policy documentation that was presented during the assessments revealed it was rarely current and was
lacking in relevant details. The policy in some instances had not been reviewed or revised for several years. In
some cases where there was the existence of a policy there existed approved procedures which were in direct
contravention to the existing policy.

Un-Patched Hardware and Software
All of the assessments conducted found exploitable vulnerability as a result of un-patched hardware and
software issues. Of particular concern were perimeter firewalls that had multiple exploitable vulnerabilities as a
result of dilettante patching regimes. These firewall exploits were well known and had been known in the
security community for up to five years. Due to the legacy nature of SCADA systems, all of the underlying
supporting computer operating systems had significant vulnerability. Most of the operating systems examined in
all assessments had long since reached end of life, and were no longer supported by the vendor. Most of the
supporting applications in the form of SQL servers, network operating systems or specific SCADA applications
were likewise no longer supported by the vendor.

Lack of Network Segregation and Segmentation
Assessments conducted so far have revealed networks that are severely compromised under the defence in-depth
strategy. Several of the network architectures were based on flat 10.0.0.0/8 networks allowing for a reversal of
the entire network including corporate and control systems. Penetration of perimeter controls would have
allowed complete sight into the enterprises examined. This would allow the easy implantation of malcode such
as packet sniffers or keystroke analysers into the network architectures.

Lack of Sound Authentication Mechanisms
Several of the installations provided generic logins to staff members for example username equals staff
password equals staff. All of the systems reviewed had no reliable or monitored audit trial for systems access.
That is no coordinated logging of even simple statistics such as logon or log off was conducted. These logins
were provided mainly for expediency and were handed out typically as a result of the work environment trusting
individuals. Given that 60 to 80% of losses sustained by successful I T. enabled crime or malfeasance is
committed by insiders (Richardson, 2008), one could postulate this is an extremely unwise move on the part of
management. Furthermore, some of the generic accounts uncovered in the examinations had root or admin level
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access to the entire IT infrastructure. This would allow any malicious individual the power to corrupt absolutely.
The use of such simple and group based passwords also allows a substantial vector for the disgruntled employee
to penetrate the system and wreak havoc with impunity.

Monitoring, logging, auditing
There was a complete lack of any substantive logging of network interactions with attendant monitoring and
then subsequent auditing and review. This observation put all organisations in an invidious position with respect
to the network based exploit and attack. This leads to the realisation that most of the organisations had no ability
to answer fundamental questions such as have we been attacked? We got hacked – how did it happen? Inability
to answer even these basic questions makes amelioration or reduction of any network borne threat a relatively
impossible task.
In one organisation there was a logging of firewall connections but no actual review of these logs to determine
any emergent threat, unauthorised connections or internal malfeasant activity. The net value of this type of
logging is a completely negative proposition for the organisation. The organisation is wasting money logging
data that was never intended to be examined.
It has been proven already due to the nature of SCADA systems that the use of intrusion detection systems and
intrusion prevention systems can shutdown communications, which can have potentially catastrophic
unintended consequences (Fink et al, 2006). If we cannot reliably implement and use intrusion detection
systems or intrusion prevention systems to protect networks that run SCADA devices, the use of monitoring
logging and auditing are fundamental tools and techniques in providing response against network based attack.
In some cases the use of these is the first and last line of defence against attacks that would be perpetrated
against networks.

COMPARISON OF ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AGAINST SECURITY
MEASURES
The results of the CNVA audits were genericised and summarised according to the criterion given in Table 1.
These results were then categorised according to the organisation type as given in Figure 1, and ranked for their
overall security posture. As can be seen in Table 2, Organisation 1 had a greater overall level of security than
did the other organisation types. Whilst the majority of the measures are quite technical in nature, even issues
such as policy and availability of documentation were areas of concern for organisations two and three.
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Table 2: Evaluation of security audit results against a common best practice framework
for three different organisational structures.

Criteria

Organisation 1

Organisation 2

Organisation 3

Firewalls
External

Yes

Yes

Yes

Multiple firewalls

Yes

No

Yes

Multiple Firewalls (different vendors)

Yes

N/A

Yes

Firewall rule sets configured correctly

Yes

No

N/A

Firewall OS / firmware patched?

Yes

No

No

DMZ between corporate and PCS

Yes

No

No

DMZ between Internet and Corporate

Yes

No

No

Logical segregation through subnets and VLANs

Yes

No

No

Access control lists on border routers

Yes

No

No

Intrusion Detection System

Yes

N/A

N/A

Secure authentication method

Yes

Yes

Yes

Two factor authentication

Yes

No

No

RSA token authentication

Yes

No

No

Policies Current?

No

No

No

Network topology diagrams current?

Yes

No

No

Firewall and Access control rules available?

Yes

Yes

No

Policy audited or enforced?

Yes

No

No

Network Segregation Measures

Remote Access

Documentation

The columns where an N/A is recorded were due to a number of factors. In some cases, it was due to the
measure not having been implemented e.g. Organisation 2 did not have multiple firewalls at the boundary
between corporate and the internet. Other N/A results were recorded because the outsourcing provider did
provide this information e.g. the outsourcing provider at Organisation 3 was not able to produce current network
diagrams.

DISCUSSION
The results presented here overwhelmingly support the notion that having dedicated information security and
technology embedded within the process control division of a critical infrastructure provider leads to the best
security outcome. However, it must be noted that this was an examination of four organisations, categorised into
three types, and that it did not examine budgets or other factors which may have influenced this outcome.
The NIST Guide to industrial control systems security does discuss the formation of a team which consists of
people from key stakeholders within an organisation, but the evidence presented here would seem to indicate
that this does not go far enough. The NIST guide states that the IT department of an organisation can have vital
input to protecting a process control network. In isolation, there is nothing wrong with this statement, but the
reality is that IT departments do not have sufficient ownership of the process control systems, and as such there
is a disconnect when it comes to protecting these systems i.e. the role of an IT security group, which is based in
the corporate is to protect the corporate network. This is not a criticism, but simply a statement of their job
purpose, and for this group to ignore their raison d’être would be negligent. There is then a paradox created
when a group dedicated to protecting one part of an organisation is asked to assist in protecting an area which
they do not have a direct interest in, and are then criticised when they do not give it their full attention. It is
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likely for this reason that those organisations using this model in order to provide IT security input for
protecting their process control networks were observed to have a level of security which was inadequate when
compared against the best practice guidelines.
Whilst it could be appropriately argued that the security issues found with organisations two and three may not
be as a direct result of the organisational structure, there is certainly a case to support the structure of
organisation one as being best practice. Noted in the assessments conducted on these organisations was a
combination of lack of governance and or direct responsibility for the SCADA / control system. The result of
this lack of responsibility was that the corporate or third party IT support groups had no direct ownership in
these systems. As a flow on effect, this lack of ownership meant that there was a corresponding lack of
understanding of the criticality of securing these systems from attack, and that the focus of their concerns from a
security perspective was the computers on the corporate network segments.
Alternatively, some groups would argue that critical infrastructure protection (CIP) should be an organisation
wide responsibility, and that there should not be a dedicated security team responsible for it. The NIST
guidelines suggest that a dedicated team made up from all areas of the organisation should be responsible for
securing CIP (Stouffer, 2008). Additionally, there are Gartner Reports suggesting that operational technology
(OT) and information technology governance need to be converged (Roberts & Steenstrup, 2010). However, this
paper paid more heed to business needs, with security a secondary consideration. Unfortunately, when the
consequence of a security breach is loss of critical infrastructure, potentially for an extended period of time,
security of the OT must take precedence. The reality, as found by examining the security of these organisations
as reported here, is that a corporate IT security manager or agent is always going to put the corporate network
first: it is the nature of the beast.
A recent report from Gartner highlighted the issue of where the information security officer should be located
within a critical infrastructure provider:
“Coordination and leadership for OT security is vital. To date, a chief information security officer
(CISO) equivalent for OT security does not exist in most utilities, though a few innovators have already
taken early steps in this area.” – Perkins (2009)
The evidence presented in this paper supports the preceding statement, given that only organisation 1 had a
CISO equivalent in the OT structure of the organisation. The other organisations reviewed in the CNVA relied
up on using the CISO from the corporate segment of the overall organisational structure.
The evidence presented in this paper would suggest that the structure of organisation where there are
information security and technology personnel embedded in the control system structure of the organisation, and
not reliance on the corporate division to provide these services, will lead to the best outcome from a security
perspective.

CONCLUSION
Whilst there are arguments that CIP security is an organisational wide responsibility, the evidence presented in
this paper suggests that the implementation of security needs to be based in the process control section of an
organisation. Organisations that rely on in house corporate information security or information technology to
provide security for their process control networks are not adequately protecting their SCADA / process control
systems. Those organisations using a model which has IS / IT specialists working as part of the control system
team achieved a higher level of security than those which did not follow this model. The reports supporting
convergence do so from a management point of view, and not from a security perspective. As evidenced by the
assessments carried out and presented here, this approach does not appear to be working, as security managed
from the corporate side of the organisation was not adequate. The evidence presented here suggests that
convergence does not lead to the best security outcomes, and that it is dangerous to impose a standard business
governance model onto critical infrastructure providers.
One area not investigated here was the relationship between budget allocated to each section, and the impact this
may have had on the security posture of the organisations that were examined as part of the CNVA process. It
may be that budgetary restrictions had a role to play in any observed security issues, and this will need to be
examined in any future research.
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Further research in this area will examine a wider range of organisations to examine their level of security and to
see whether this apparent connection between organisational structure and security level holds true across a
wider sample.
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